Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are a pow erful formalism for reasoning under uncer tainty but bear some severe limitations: they require a large amount of information be fore any reasoning process can start, they have limited contradiction handling capabil ities, and their ability to provide explana tions for their conclusion is still controversial. There exists a class of reasoning systems, called 11-uth Maintenance Systems (TMSs), which are able to deal with partially speci fied knowledge, to provide well-founded ex planation for their conclusions, and to detect and handle contradictions. TMSs incorporat ing measure of uncertainty are called Belief Maintenance Systems (BMss). This paper de scribes how a BMS based on probabilitistic logic can be applied to BBNs, thus introduc ing a new class of BBNs, called Ignorant Be lief Networks, able to incrementally deal with partially specified conditional dependencies, to provide explanations, and to detect and handle contradictions.
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Introduction
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are a powerful for malism for reasoning under uncertainty. They have been summarized by Pearl (Pearl, 1988 ), but they have been independently developed by several researchers during the past few years. BBNs have been successfully applied to several domains, from medical diagnosis to natural language understanding.
A BBN is a direct acyclic graph in which nodes repre sent stochastic variables and arcs represent conditional dependencies among the variables. BBNs are particu larly appealing since they are based on a sound prob abilistic semantics and they are the reasoning cores of complete decision making systems, call ed Inffuence Di agrams. From a probabilistic point of view, they pro vide a straightforward way to represent dependency Despite a considerable success, BBNs bear some severe limitations:
Ignorance: They require a large amount of infor mation. The number of conditional probabili ties needed to specify a conditional dependency grows exponentially with the number of parent variables. This effect leads to serious difficulties since all the conditionals probabilities defining a conditional dependency among variables, as well as all the prior probabilities for the root variables, have to be known before any reasoning process can start. Moreover, each probability assignment expresses in a single number both the belief about an event and the reliability of such a belief. Both these limitations arise from the inability of BBNs to distinguish between uncertainty and ignorance. Explanation: The ability of BBNs to provide an ex planation for their conclusions is still controver sial, and it represents a challenge for researchers in the area. Consistency: BBNs improve over the traditional scheme of Bayesian expert systems (Charnia.k, 1991) , since they ensure that if a network is locally consistent, it is also globally consistent. Problems arise when an inconsistent probability value is as signed, because they do not provide any efficient contradiction handling method. It would be bet ter if they were able to identify the set of incon sistent assignments and ask for the retraction of one (or some) of them.
Researchers in Artificial Intelligence have developed a class of reasoning systems, called 11-uth Maintenance Systems (TMss) (McAllester, 1990) , which are able to deal with partially specified knowledge, to provide well-founded explanation for their conclusions, and to detect and handle contradictions (Forbus and de Kleer, 1992) .
During the past decade, three main classes of TMSs have emerged: Justification-based TMSs (JTMss) (Doyle, 1979) , Assumption-based TMSs (ATMSs) (de Kleer, 1986a) , and Logic-based TMSs (LT:Mss) (McAllester, 1980) . A JTMS records derivability de pendencies among propositions and propagates binary truth-values along chains of dependencies. The ATMS also records derivability dependencies among proposi tions, but rather than propagating truth-values it la bels each proposition with the minimal consistent set of assumptions under which it can be derived. On the other hand, a LTMS manipulates full propositional formulas built from propositions and truth-functional connectives, rather than networks of dependencies, and propagates truth-values using a unit resolution style algorithm called Boolean Constraint Propagation (scP) (McAllester, 1990 (Falkenhainer, 1986) devel oped a Justification-based BMS, introducing Dempster Shafer (Shafer, 1976) belief functions in a JTMS. De Kleer and Will iams (de Kleer and Willi ams, 1987) augmented the ATMS formalism with probability mea sures. Laskey and Lehner (Laskey and Lehner, 1989) proved a formal equivalence between the belief of a proposition computed by a Dempster-Shafer func tion and the probability of the ATMS-label of the proposition, and they provide a correct algorithm for computing the beliefs of these labels. D'Ambrosio (D'Ambrosio, 1987) exploited the ATMS architecture to compute a special case of belief functions.
We have extended the third class of TMSs to proba bility, thus producing a Logic-based BMS(LBMS) (Ra moni and Riva, 1993) . This paper will describe how this method for belief maintenance can be applied to BBNs, thus introducing a new class of BBNs able to incrementally deal with partially specified conditional dependencies and prior probabilities, to provide well founded explanations for their conclusions, and to de tect and handle contradictions. 
Logic-based Belief Maintenance
In this section, we will summarize the description of a new kind of BMS, called logic-based BMS, in which the Boolean operators of standard logic act as constraints on the probabilistic truth-values of propositions. The LBMS can be regarded as a generalization to interval truth-values of t he BCP used by the LTMS. As the LTMS is based on standard propositional calculus, the LBMS is based on the (propositional fragment of) probabilis tic logic.
2.1
Preliminaries
The LBMS assumes a propositional language defined by an infinite set of atomic propositions S = { a11 
Probabilistie Logie
Probabilistic logic (Nilsson, 1986 ) provides a semantic framework for extending the standard (Boolean) con cept of satisfaction to a probabilistic one, that can be interpreted in terms of the Venn Diagram represen tation of the probability of a proposition. The prob ability P0(a;) of a proposition a, is bounded by the following inequality:
Inequality (1) may be regarded as the probabilistic in terpretation of modus ponens: from Po(ai) = Pl and Po(ai :::: :> a;) :::: :: P2 we can derive bounds of probability representing the truth-value of a;. Moreover, it is a special case of a more general inequality that applies to any clause. Let C = V':: 1 a; be a clause, the prob ability of a; is bounded by the following inequality:
Po(C)-LPo(ai)::; Po(a;)::; Po(C)
The right hand side of (2) is obvious: no proposi tion may have a probability greater than the maxi mum probability of any disjunction it is part of. In set-theoretic terms, this means that a set cannot be larger than its union with other sets. The left hand side states that the minimum probability of a propo sition has to be equal to or greater than the diff erence between the probability of any clause C in which it ap pears and the probability of any literal appearing in C. Unfortunately, the constraints directly derived from inequality (2) turn out to be too weak: the bounds they produce are too wide, thus including inconsistent values. The INFERNO system (Quinlan, 1983) , that is usually regarded as a local approximation to proba bilistic logic (Pearl, 1988; Nilsson, 1993) , exhibits this kind of behavior, in producing wider bounds. Because of that, INFERNO has been strongly criticized (Pearl, 1988) .
2.3
Constraints
The weakness of the constraints derived from (2) arises from too strong an enforcement of their locality based on the assumption that all proposition in a clause are pairwise disjoint and, in the Venn Diagram represen tation of a clause, the intersection of all propositions is always empty. It is apparent that this assumption is too strong.
In order to drop this assumption, we need to represent this intersection among propositions in a clause. We call it overlapping factor. The overlapping factor of a
where { a1, ... , a n } are atomic propositions, a1 a0 = •a, and the function a is defined as:
In order to compute the overlapping factor of a clause C, we need to know the probability of those clauses that contain exactly the same set of atomic propo sitions, and hence to abandon the strict locality of clauses.
Generalizing definition (2) to interval truth-values, we derived a set of constraints on the minimum and max imum probability of propositions (Ramoni and Riva, 1993) , by dropping the assumption that all literals in a clause are pairwise disjoint.
The first constraint enforces the left hand side of (2).
Constraint 1 The probability of a propmition ai m clause C i$ bounded by:
P.(a,);::: P(C) +:Fe-2:: P"(aj) j;f. i where :Fe i8 the overlapping factor of clau8e C.
The second constraint is directly derived from the well known Additivity axiom which states that if a, is an atomic proposition, and { </>1, ••• , tjJ2 .. } is the set of all the conjunctions that contain all possible combinations of the same n atomic propositions negated and un negated, then:
The minimum probability of a propo8i tion a i8 bounded by:
In constraint 2, we replaced the equality in (4 ) with an inequality because the constraint 2 holds also when only a subset of the clauses {( •a; V ljj 1), . .. , ( •a• V .P2")} is known, and causes P. (a.) to increase mono tonically as the number of known clauses increases.
Hence, if -{-•a• V .Pi) is the clause obtained by the ap plication of De Morgan's laws, we have P* (a, 1\ ¢1) = 1-P. ( ..., ai V .Pi). It is worth noting that the constraint 2 subsumes the right hand side of inequality (2).
From the definitions above, we can easily derive a def inition of inconsistency in the LBMS network. An in consistency can arise when, for any proposition a; in the network:
or when, for a clause C in the network: n LP"(a,)-:Fe< P.(C) (6) i=l Where :Fe is the overlapping factor of the clause C. If P.(ai) > P*(a,), then no probability function Po(a,) can exist such that P.(ai) ::; P0(a,) ::; P"(ai)· When condition (6) is met, there is no way to satisfy C since the sum of all maximum probabilities of propositions does not cover the minimum probability of C.
2.4
Propagation
In a LTMS, each clause represents a logical constraint on the truth-values of its propositions. To be satis fi ed, a clause must contain at least one proposition whose truth-value is consistent with its sign in the clause: true if the proposition appears unnegated in the clause, false if it appears negated. When all propositions but one violate their sign in a clause, the clause is said to be unit-open, and the LTMS forces the remaining proposition to have the truth-value in dicated by its sign, thus preventing the assignment of inconsistent truth-values. Contradiction may arise in two ways: a proposition is labeled both true and false or a clause is completely violated, i.e. each of its propositions has a truth-value opposite to its sign in the clause. In the LBMS, these two situations cor respond to the inconsistency conditions (5) and {6), respectively.
In the LBMS, we have two constraints to apply. The constraint 2 is applied only when a new clause is added to the network. The application of this constraint ex ploits its incremental character. The current imple mentation uses a set of table1 each of which stores all the clauses containing the same set of proposi tions and the constraint is applied to each literal in the clause. Moreover, this method allows us to incre mentally record the overlapping factor of the clauses currently known by the LBMS. Constraint 1 is applied when the maximum probability of all the literals in the clause C but one is less than the probability of C. In this case, the clause is unit open, and the constraint in creases appropriately the minimum probability of the remaining literal. The algorithm for applying the con straint is basically a Waltz's propagation algorithm extended to intervals, and it is described in (Ramoni and Riva, 1993) : each proposition is labeled with a set of possible values, and the constraints (in our case, the application of the above defined constraints to the clauses) are used to restrict this set. The LBMS can exhibit this behavior because if a clause is satisfied for a given truth-value of a proposition P(a,) = [p. p*], it will be satisfied for any subset of [p. p*]. This prop erty, which is implicit in the form of the inequalities in our constraints, implies a monotonic narrowing of the truth-values, thus ensuring the incrementality of the LBMS.
Properties
Extending the usual logical concepts of soundness and completeness from Boolean values to probability inter vals (Grosof, 1986) , we can say that the system defined by the constraints 1 and 2 is probabilistically sound (i.e. it returns intervals that are equal to or wider than the intended ones), but it is not complete (i.e. it does not return intervals that are equal to or stricter than the intended ones). This incompleteness is due to the fact that the LBMS calculates the overlapping fac tor of a clause C using just a particular set of clauses (i.e., those that contain exactly the same set of atomic propositions as C) and does not exploit the other sets of clauses that define the overlapping factor of C, for example, the powerset of all propositions contained in clause C.
There are two motivating factors behind the choice of this particular set of clauses. First of all, we found that the calculation of the overlapping factor is the only source of complexity in the LBMS which, being assimilable to the BCP, runs in linear time and space with respect to the number of clauses. Since we have devised an efficient method to calculate the overlap ping factor and to apply constraint 2, and since proba bilistic entailment is known to be intractable in nature (Nilsson, 1993) , the incompleteness of the LBMS rep resents a compromise between functionality and effi ciency. Furthermore, the representation in the LBMS of a probabilistic model expressed in terms of conditional probabilitie1 produces a set of clauses that is exactly Belief Maintenance in Bayesian Networks 501 the one needed to calculate the overlapping factor and to apply the constraint 2. The representation of con ditional probabilities in the LBMS is straightforward using the Chain Rule:
The resulting conjunction is converted into clausal form through De Morgan's laws and it is then commu nicated to the LBMS. For instance, the probabilistic model defined by the two conditionals Po(a2[a1) = 0.2 and Po(a2 l •a1 ) = 0.6 with Po(a1 ) = 0.5 may be ex pressed by the set of clauses: Po( at Va2) = 0.8, P0(a1 V •a2) = 0.7, Po( •at V a2) = 0.6, Po(•at V •a2) = 0.9.
Ignorant Belief Networks
Using the LBMS, it is possible to develop a new class of BBNs based on the LBMS and henceforth able to rea son with partially specified conditional dependencies (i.e. lacking some conditional probabilities) and inter val probability values. We call these BBNs Ignorant Belief Networks (IBNs).
Definitions
A BBN is a direct acyclic graph in which nodes repre sent stochastic variables and arcs represent conditional dependencies among those variables. A variable is de fined by a finite set of states representing the assign ment of a value to the variable. Each state in a variable is evaluated by a probability value. Each dependency is defined by the set of all conditional probabilities re lating the states of the parent variables to the states of the children variables. We will now describe how these definitions can be translated into the LBMS network.
Variables In a BBN, all the states of a variable are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: the probability val ues assigned to all the states in a variable have to sum to unit. In an IBN, when a variable is defined, each state is communicated to the LBMS as a proposition. Moreover, a set of clauses is installed to ensure that the states of the variable are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For all propositions at, ... , an in the LBMS representing the states of the variable, the disjunction a1 V • • • V an and all the conjunctions • ( a0 1\ ai) (with i f-j) are asserted as true in the LBMS. When a proba bility value is assigned to a proposition a, representing a state of the variable, the LBMS receives the clause P* (ai+l V ... V an) = (1'1 where {ai+l• . .. , an} is the set of proposition representing those states in the vari- " P*(a;l\atA ..• Aa,.) =II (P"(a;))P•(a;iat, ... ,a,.) j= l " P.(..., a;l\atl\ ... Aa,.) = II(P.(a;))(l-P"(aolat, ... ,a,.)) j=l
The direction of a conditional dependency can be re versed by using the Inversion Rule and applying the above defined constraints to the resulting conditionals.
Propagation
From the theory of the TMss, the LBMS inherits the concept of consumer (de Kleer, 1986b) . A consumer is a forward-chained procedure attached to each propo sition, that is fired when the truth-value of the propo sition is changed. The BMSs theory extends the defini tion of consumers from Boolean to probabilistic truth values. In the LBMS, a consumer can be defined as fueable when the minimum probability of its propo sition is raised, the maximum probability is lowered, or when the difference between the maximum and the minimum probability is decreased.
When a variable is defined in the IBN, for each propo sition representing its states in the LBMS, two dif ferent consumers are defined. The first consumer is used to communicate to the LBMS the clause P*(ai+l V ... V an)= u above defined, in order to en force the exhaustivity and exclusivity among states in a variable. A second consumer is used to encode the conditional probabilities among states, and it is de fined when a conditional dependency is installed in the network. When it is fired, it applies the Chain Rule to the defined conditional and communicates the appropriate clauses to the LBMS. A prior probability assignment to a state in a variable is communicated to the LBMS by assuming the corresponding proposition with the assigned probability. When the proposition is assumed, the attached consumers are fired, thus start ing the propagation process.
Using consumers, IBNs do not perform any computa tion themselves, but rather act as a high-level knowl edge representation language, while the propagation of probabilities is performed by the LBMS. Hence, the computational cost of a propagation grows linearly in space and time with respect to the number of condi tional probabilities, even if the number of conditional probabilities needed to specify a conditional depen dency grows exponentially with the number of parent variables in the dependency.
3.3
Properties
In the introduction, we claimed that the use of a LBMS to develop BBNs could enhance their ability to deal with partially specified probabilistic information, to provide explanations and to handle contradictions.
Ignoranee We can identify two different kinds of ig norance that can be represented in this framework: complete ignorance about a conditional probability and partial information about a conditional or prior probability in the network. Since the probability of both propositions and clauses in the LBMS is repre sented by probability intervals, IBNs are endowed with the ability to express both interval conditional prob abilities and interval prior probabilities. Moreover, since conditionals are locall y defined and propagated, the reasoning process can start even without the full definition of the joint probability distribution. These features enable the IBNs to represent both the complete ignorance of a conditional probability and the partial information about a conditional or a prior probability.
Explanation TMSs provide rational explanation for their conclusions by describing how these conclusions follow from the current set of assumptions (Forbus and de Kleer, 1992) : they not only trace back the set of assumptions responsible for the conclusion but they also describe the derivation steps that lead from those assumptions to the conclusion to be explained.
In the LBMS, each proposition is labeled with an in terval truth-value. Hence, the LBMS has to explain the assignment of both its lower and upper bound, that could have been derived from different assump tions trough diff erent paths. In the current imple mentation, the lower and the upper bounds of the in terval associated to each propositions are indexed by the clause that set them during the constraint prop agation. To explain the assignment of a minimum or of a maximum probability to a proposition, the LBMS uses a quite simple algorithm. If no clause is sup porting the assignment, then the proposition is itself the assumption responsible for its own assignment. If the clause sets the value trough the application of the constraint 2, no assumption is responsible for the as signment because it is directly set by the clause. If the assignment is due to the application of the con straint 1, all the the literals but the one to be explained had their maximum probability lowered and the LBMS is reached, it is returned as an explanation, together with the path followed to reach it. In the IBN, this mechanism has to be enhanced since the assumption of a proposition also causes the generation of clauses, namely, those clauses generated by conditionals and those supplementary clauses needed to enforce the ex haustivity and exclusivity among states in a variable. These clauses are labeled with the proposition that generated them, so that the explanatory algorithm of the IBN is able to follow also these additional paths in order to reach the assumptions and return them as explanations.
Consistency One of the fundamental tasks of TMss is to detect and recover inconsistencies during the problem solving process. Since a BBN is known to be globally consistent if it is locally consistent, the LBMS maintains the consistency of a IBN by checking if one of the inconsistency conditions (5) and (6) is met. When an inconsistency arises, the LBMS uses the same al gorithm exploited in the explanatory process to trace back the assumptions responsible for the inconsistency, and ask for their retraction. The algorithm for retrac tion has been extended in order to take into account that the assumption of a state in a IBN generates addi tional clauses. Hence, in the current implementation, when a state in the IBN is retracted, the clauses gener ated by its assumption are deleted, and the constraints they impose over the network are relaxed.
.An Example
In a standard BBN, all the conditional probabilities that make up a conditional probability distribution are needed before any reasoning process can start. We will now show with an example how the IBN is instead able to reason from incomplete conditional probability dis tributions and underspecifi ed prior probabilities. The example is composed of three steps. In the first step,
we will communicate to the system the conditional probabilities listed in the first column of Table 1 , and we will assign interval prior probabilities to the states in the root variables. Note that two conditional prob abilities are missing, and two have an interval value.
In the second step, we will refine the prior probabili ties turning them into point-valued probabilities, and in the third step we will use the complete conditional probability distribution. Figures 1-4 show the graph ical representation of the networks generated in the various steps of the example. The pop-up windows over the variables graphically describe the probability interval (subset of [O 1]) associated to each one of their states. In each bar, the area between 0 and P.(a;) is black, the area between P"(a,) and 1 is white, and the area between P.(a;) and P"(a;) is gray. Thus, the width of the gray area is proportional to the ignorance about the probability.
In
Step 1, we have communicated to the IBN the condi tional probabilities listed in the first column of [0.85 0.95] as the prior probability for [tampering:yes] . All the other probability intervals appearing in Figure 1 were set by the propagation al gorithm. 
Finally, in
Step 3 the complete conditional probabil ity distribution listed in the third column of Table 1 Figure 3: The IBN defined by the underspecified con ditional distribution in Table 1 and point-valued prior probabilities. Table 1 and point-valued prior probabilities.
is used. In this case, all the intervals degenerate to point-valued probabilities, and the IBN converges to the values of a standard BBN, as shown in Figure 4 . Ta ble 2 summarizes the probability intervals associated to each proposition in each one of the steps described above.
Conclusions
We have introduced a new method to deal with par tially specified probabilistic models and we have ap plied it to develop a new class of BBNs, based on a LBMS, able to reason with incomplete information on the basis of an explicit representation of ignorance.
Fu rthermore, the LBMS provides the IBN with the abil ity of detecting and handling contradictions, and of producing well-founded explanations for its conclu sions. We have applied the IBNs to the forecasting blood glucose concentration in insulin-dependent dia betic patients using underspecified probabilistic mod ds directly derived from a database containing the daily follow-up of 70 insulin-dependent diabetic pa tients, in which a very small subset of the complete conditional model needed to define a BBN was avail able. Instead of the 19200 conditional probabilities required, only 2262 were available (that is, less than 12%), and most of them were aff ected by ignorance (the mean diff erence between the maximum and min- The probability intervals associated to propositions in the successive steps of the example. imuro probability of the conditionals was 0.19) (Ra moni et al., 1994) . Still , the system was able to reason and make predictions, taking into account the igno rance about the distributions.
Since BBNs are the reasoning cores of general decision making systems, called Inf1uence Diagrams, we are ex tending our work to develop a new class of Influence Diagrams (a sort of Ignorant Influence Diagrams) able to deal with sets of admissible decisions given bounds on distributions over the expected utilities.
